SECURING CONTAINERS What's so different?

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Software development Automation DevOps Consulting Forensics Pen testing Malware reversing Cryptography



"Containers don't contain." – Dan Walsh

"... but they sure are handy!" – your developers





- What is a container?
- What are the security implications?
- How do I respond?









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Image Registry









Image Registry















Kernel Escapes






Kernel Escapes





Kernel Escapes



- Kernel design is open by default
 - Therefore, trying to close holes
 - Not everything is namespaced
- Kernel bugs → Container escapes



Mindset: Container Isolation

A container is **not** like a VM.


A container is like an **application package** running in a *slightly leaky* sandbox.



Policy: Operating Systems

Use a **container-focused** host operating system.





Project Atomic




etc. etc. (Google for more)

* All brands are the property of their respective owners.



Over-Privileged Containers





Over-Privileged Containers



- The --privileged Option
- Exposing the Docker socket
- Over-reaching volume mounts
- Unlimited resource allocation




Mindset: Least Privilege

Don't give a container what you wouldn't give a regular application.

- Don't run as root inside the container
- Drop as many privileges as you can
- Minimize what volume mounts expose
- Set resource constraints



Daemon Dangers





Daemon Dangers

- Underlying socket API
 - No authorization required!
 - Can be exposed to the network
- Run a container \Rightarrow root on the host





Mindset: Least Privilege

Minimize access to the Docker daemon.

- Avoid exposing to the network
- Think of docker run like sudo



Image Distribution







Image Distribution

Image Registry



- Malicious source?
- Tampering in the registry?
- Tampering in transit?
- Tampering on the host system?




POLICY: SIGNED ARTIFACTS

We already do this for regular software updates.

- Unfortunately, competing approaches
- Some implementations raise issues
 - Docker Content Trust uses ToFU
- Consider running an in-house registry




Vulnerable Dependencies





Vulnerable Dependencies



- In direct dependencies
- In the base image
- Cannot idiomatically patch at run-time



Mindset: Re-build Images

The old way was...

The new way is...

- Install a patch
- Restart the application

- Rebuild the image
- Re-deploy the container



Mindset: Inventory & Scans

Simpler to scan **images**, not hosts.

(Run a private image registry.)

Asset tracking of where images are running.






- "Container's don't contain."
 - They're not VM's
 - It helps if you use a container-focused host OS
- Don't give a container what you wouldn't give a regular host application
- Restrict access to the Docker daemon
- Verify image signatures / Have a plan for distribution
- Scan images for vulns & re-deploy from fresh images
 - Use your own private image registry








kubernetes



Hardening Basics



CC BY-SA: Wikipedia user Khtan66

- API Server: TLS + Auth + RBAC
- etcd: Mutual TLS auth
- kubelet: Disable anonymous auth








Istio


IMPLICATIONS



- Separates data plane from control plane
- Pro: Mutual TLS everywhere
- Con: Single point of failure



Source: https://istio.io/docs/concepts/what-is-istio/





DIDACTIC SECURITY Questions?